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The liability of roads authorities revisited 
 
Eleanor J Russell* 
 
Introduction 
Recent years have witnessed much litigation against roads authorities in 
circumstances where injuries have been said to result from dangers on or about the 
roadway. The Scottish courts, unlike their English counterparts,1 have long 
recognised that, at common law, liability may be incurred by roads authorities to 
those using the roads in respect of hazards thereon. That principle is restated in the 
Inner House decision in Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council 2 and is applied in a 
number of subsequent cases which are examined here and from which practical 
guidance can be drawn. 
 
Liability of roads authorities in Scotland 
The general powers and duties of local roads authorities in Scotland are found in the 
Roads (Scotland) Act 1984.3 Section 1(1) of the Act provides that a local roads 
authority ‘shall manage and maintain’ all roads4 in its area as are entered in its ‘list of 
public roads’. Extensive powers are conferred in this regard including the “power to 
reconstruct, alter, widen, improve or renew any such road or to determine the means 
by which the public right of passage over it may be exercised.” Section 1 does not 
however impose any obligation on a roads authority to persons using the road. 
Accordingly, any liability of a roads authority to road users must be sought in the 
general law of negligence. Writing in 1899, Guthrie set out the principle governing 
the liability of magistrates and road trustees as follows: 
 
“[T]he general rule is now fixed, that statutory trustees and local authorities, 
unless the statute under which they act provide otherwise, are liable to make 
good in their corporate capacity and out of their public funds, the damage 
caused by their own or their servants’ fault, in the same way as individuals. 
The magistrates of a burgh, being charged with the duty of keeping the streets 
in good order, are liable in damages to persons injured by their being in an 
unsafe condition.”5 
Guthrie noted that this principle was supported by case law. An early example is 
Innes v Magistrates of Edinburgh.6 There, the pursuer broke his thighbone when he 
fell into an unguarded pit in an Edinburgh lane. An action for damages against the 
magistrates (as the persons responsible for the city’s streets) was held to be well 
founded. The streets of a burgh were under the control of the magistrates and they 
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were responsible for negligently inflicted injury resulting from dangers in the streets, 
under ordinary principles of delictual responsibility.  
Later cases disclosed a similar approach. McFee and Ors v Police Commissioners of 
Broughty Ferry7 arose following the death of a cab driver when his head struck a 
railway bridge which was of insufficient height to allow a cab to pass. The police 
commissioners had taken over the road in question as a public street. The Lord 
Justice Clerk articulated the nature of the commissioners’ duty in the following 
terms:8 
“If anything occurs to create a danger on [the roads of which they have the 
control], it is their duty to guard against it. It is their business not to allow traffic 
to pass along the road until they have either put the road into a proper state, 
or (if they desire to maintain that another person or body is liable to do so) 
until they have caused that person or body to perform the duty.” 
In Strachan v Aberdeen District Committee of the County Council of Aberdeenshire9 
the Inner House held that a claim of damages was competent against the county 
council for injuries arising from its failure to keep a road adequately fenced. Apart 
from a “temporary eclipse”10 of the principle (which followed the decision in Findlater 
v Duncan11) the courts in Scotland have accepted for over 200 years that roads 
authorities (and their predecessors) are liable for known defects in or around the 
roadway.12  
 
A trilogy of recent cases 
Against that background of a considerable (and almost unbroken) line of authority, 
attention is now turned to a trilogy of recent cases which challenge that traditional 
Scottish approach - Macdonald v Aberdeenshire Council,13 Bowes v Highland 
Council14 and Dewar v Scottish Borders Council.15  
 
Macdonald concerned an accident which occurred when the pursuer, who was 
travelling on a class C country road, drove through a crossroads into the path of a 
van travelling on a class A road. The pursuer was injured and her passengers were 
killed. In an action of damages against the roads authority, the pursuer averred that 
the configuration of the road rendered visibility of the junction poor, that the road 
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markings had been worn away, that a “Give Way” sign was not obvious and that 
consequently she was unaware that she was approaching a junction where she was 
required to give way. She asserted that the authority had created a danger to road 
users and had failed to take reasonable care to devise, institute and maintain a 
reasonable system of installation, inspection and repair of the road markings and 
signage at the junction. Lord Uist, in the Outer House,16 dismissed the action on the 
grounds that the defenders did not owe any duty of care to the pursuer as a user of a 
road under their control. In so holding, the Lord Ordinary followed the decision of 
Lord Stott in Murray v Nicholls17 as approved by Lord Rodger in Gorringe v 
Calderdale Metropolitan Borough Council.18 The pursuer reclaimed, asserting that 
her pleadings did disclose a relevant case against the roads authority as a matter of 
Scots law. The reclaiming motion came before an Extra Division of the Inner House 
comprising Lady Paton, Lord Drummond Young and Lord Wheatley.  
 
Lady Paton observed that, in terms of the Roads (Scotland) Act 1984, the authority 
had the right and power to repaint the lines and to reposition or add further road 
signs but she did not accept that the defenders owed the pursuer a common law 
duty of care to do so. The existence of a duty depended upon the facts and 
circumstances of each case. In her Ladyship’s view, drivers using the crossroads 
were in a sufficiently proximate relationship to the authority to give rise to a duty of 
care. It was not, however, reasonably foreseeable that an accident was likely to 
occur at the junction. The wearing away of the lines had been a gradual process and 
there were no averments of complaints in this regard or about the location of the 
“Give Way” sign. Nor, in Lady Paton’s view, was it fair, just and reasonable to 
impose a duty of care on the defenders as the situation at the crossroads did not 
present as a high priority situation with obvious danger demanding prompt attention 
from the authority “burdened as it [was] with many tasks and duties to perform.”19  
 
Lord Drummond Young, having reviewed numerous Scottish authorities, offered the 
following formulation of the present state of Scots law:20 
 
“A roads authority is liable in negligence at common law for any failure to deal 
with a hazard that exists on the roads under its control. A ‘hazard’ for this 
purpose is something that would present a significant risk of an accident to a 
person proceeding along the road in question with due skill and care.”  
His Lordship drew attention to the use of the words “danger” or “dangerous” in the 
authorities and continued:21  
“This means that, for a roads authority to be liable to a person who suffers 
injury because of the state of a road under their charge, two features must 
exist. First, the injury must be caused by a hazard, the sort of danger that 
would create a significant risk of an accident to a careful road user. Secondly, 
the authority must be at fault in failing to deal with the hazard. This means that 
the pursuer must establish that a roads authority of ordinary competence 
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using reasonable care would have identified the hazard and would have taken 
steps to correct it, whether by altering the road, or by placing suitable signs, or 
in an extreme case by closing the road.” 
The first requirement allows a roads authority to assume that road users will proceed 
with reasonable skill and care, paying heed to obvious dangers on the road and 
driving accordingly. There is no obligation on a roads authority to protect drivers from 
anything that is obvious e.g. bends, blind summits, visible road junctions, and the 
fact that the driver's view is restricted by buildings, vegetation, land features or the 
configuration of the road. In such a situation, a careful driver should slow down and 
look carefully ahead. If he does not do so, the accident is his own fault. The second 
requirement means that the hazard must be apparent to a competent roads 
engineer. Lord Drummond Young stated:22 
“[T]his state of the law strikes a fair and reasonable balance between the 
interests of drivers and their passengers on one hand and the interests of the 
roads authority on the other hand… Eliminating hazards, in the sense 
discussed above, is the minimum that can be expected of [roads authorities]. 
The fundamental fairness of such a duty is supported by consideration of the 
insurance implications of an accident. Third party motor insurance is of course 
compulsory, and if an accident is caused by a driver's fault those who are 
injured, including his passengers, may expect to obtain recovery from his 
insurer. If the driver is not at fault, however, there can be no recovery, from 
the insurer or the driver. If an accident occurs because of a hazard, in the 
sense discussed above, the critical point is that there is no fault on the part of 
the driver; it is the road that is dangerous rather than the driver. In such a 
case, therefore, passengers will only recover anything if the roads authority is 
liable.” 
Lord Drummond Young observed that the law has not developed along parallel lines 
north and south of the border.23 Scots law, which holds that roads authorities are 
subject to a common law duty to road users, was developed through a series of 
cases extending over 200 years and possibly had its origins in Roman law.24 English 
law, on the other hand, holds that no duty is owed by a roads authority to road users 
at common law. The respondents’ argument in Macdonald was that Scots law should 
ignore its own traditions and should follow English law. Lord Drummond Young 
observed that “English law was always different”25 but that there was “nothing 
intrinsically undesirable about such a difference.”26 In his view, Scots law operated 
rationally in allowing for liability to be imposed in respect of hazards. There was a 
clear economic justification for the Scottish approach in that redress could be 
provided in cases which are not covered by the compulsory system of motor 
insurance. Furthermore, the cost of eliminating hazards would not be unduly 
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burdensome for a roads authority which took its responsibilities seriously. Lord 
Drummond Young discerned no reason for Scots law to follow English cases. 
Nonetheless, the English cases did make some general points about the law of 
negligence and it was appropriate to examine them to ascertain whether Scots law 
reflected the policy considerations which underpinned the English decisions. Under 
the tripartite approach of Caparo Industries plc v Dickman,27 the existence of a duty 
depended upon foreseeability of damage, proximity of relationship and whether it 
was fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty. As Caparo had been adopted into 
Scots law, it was necessary to consider whether the Scots law rule that a roads 
authority might be liable to road users in negligence was fair and reasonable. Lord 
Drummond Young concluded that it was, perhaps more so than the current English 
approach. In so concluding, his Lordship had regard to the context, “a context which 
includes the system of motor insurance.”28 
Lord Hoffmann in Gorringe29 had asserted that there was no need for highways 
authorities to be liable for accidents, and that compulsory third-party insurance was 
intended to ensure that compensation could be paid to those injured by careless 
driving. Lord Drummond Young expressed his agreement with that as a general 
proposition but observed that some accidents are caused by hazards which a careful 
driver would not see. Those cases were not covered by the system of insurance. It 
was in such circumstances that the Scottish common law duty came into operation- it 
provided “compensation for a limited category of accidents that are not caused by 
any fault of the drivers concerned.”30. 
Lord Rodger in Gorringe had asserted that Scots common law is “somewhat more 
generous to those injured due to the failure to maintain the roads than was English 
common law.”31 Lord Drummond Young reiterated that point but noted that much of 
what was said in Gorringe “supports the general approach of the Scottish common 
law.”32 Nonetheless, Lord Drummond Young concluded that :33 
“English law is different from Scots law, but … Scots law is quite coherent as 
it stands and has no need to move into line with English law. Many of the 
differences between Scots and English law are historical in nature, and the 
statutory background is quite different; consequently there are dangers in 
adopting the law of one jurisdiction uncritically into the other.”  
 
Turning to the pursuer’s pleadings, Lord Drummond Young highlighted the 
averments that there were buildings and yards situated on either side of the C road 
on which the pursuer was travelling and, because of a dip in the road which entered 
into a rising left hand bend, there was no advance view of the junction. Lord 
Drummond Young stated that “the risk of something unseen might be thought to be 
obvious, and in that event it would be appropriate to slow down.”34 Significantly, the 
pursuer’s pleadings did not address adequately the critical question of whether there 
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was a ‘hazard’. Rather, they were suggestive of an obvious danger. There were no 
averments of complaints or of any history of accidents at the locus. Lord Drummond 
Young stressed that “the need for averments from which the existence of a hazard 
can be inferred is fundamental, and in the absence of any such averments the 
pursuer's case must be irrelevant.”35  
Macdonald was subsequently applied in Bowes.36 There, a driver was killed after his 
pickup truck struck a weakened parapet on the Kyle of Tongue bridge. Rather than 
propelling the driver back into the carriageway as it ought to have done, the parapet 
“unzipped” and a section of it swung out from the bridge. The driver’s truck left the 
bridge, falling into the water below and the driver drowned. The roads authority’s 
engineer had reported defects in the bridge several years previously. He had 
categorized defects to the parapet as severe and recommended that repairs be 
carried out within the following financial year. He also recommended that the bridge 
parapet condition should be checked twice yearly to monitor deterioration until 
parapet replacement was effected. Although such a system of monitoring was 
instituted, it was subsequently discontinued. Notwithstanding the engineer’s 
recommendation that interim measures be put in place pending replacement of the 
parapet, the authority had failed to institute appropriate interim measures to deal with 
the unknown containment capacity of the parapet.  
 
Although it has been said that “in practice, it may be difficult to ascertain what 
constitutes a hazard,”37 Lord Mulholland had no such difficulty in Bowes. Indeed, he 
was quick to reject the defender’s contention that the weakened parapet was not a 
hazard. It was defective and its containment capacity was unknown. It posed a 
danger to road users and there was a significant risk of an accident caused by it. The 
authority argued that a parapet was not designed for careful road users but rather for 
drivers who were at fault. The Lord Ordinary disagreed. While a parapet may come 
to the aid of drivers at fault, it could also assist drivers who were not at fault such as 
those suffering heart attacks and losing consciousness and those shunted from 
behind. Mr Bowes was entitled to rely on the parapet. Had it been functioning as 
designed, his truck would not have left the bridge and he would not have drowned. 
 
Having ascertained that a hazard existed, Lord Mulholland turned to the issue of 
whether the authority was at fault in failing to deal with the hazard prior to the 
accident. The authority had knowledge of the hazard some five years prior to the 
accident. There was a pressing need to address this hazard and a reasonable 
authority would have implemented interim measures (such as speed reduction, 
single lane carriage and temporary barriers) pending the replacement of the parapet. 
Had the authority done so, Mr Bowes’ death would have been prevented. The two 
stage test propounded by Lord Drummond Young in Macdonald was accordingly 
satisfied and the council was found liable.38 
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The result was otherwise in Dewar v Scottish Borders Council.39 There, the pursuer 
was injured in a motorcycle accident on the A701 road. At a double bend, he 
encountered a damaged area of road surface whereupon his motorcycle left the road 
and continued onto a grass verge. The motorcycle’s front wheel struck a large stone 
and the pursuer was thrown from the motorcycle and sustained serious injuries. He 
raised an action for damages against the Scottish Borders Council in which he 
averred that the accident was caused by a dangerous defect in the road, which the 
defenders had negligently failed to inspect, maintain and repair. The case came 
before Lord Pentland for a proof before answer on the issue of liability.  
 
The pursuer asserted that the eroded area constituted a “hazard” which gave rise to 
a significant risk of an accident to a careful road user and that the defenders were at 
fault in failing to deal with the hazard before his accident. The defenders denied that 
they were at fault. They maintained that they had a reasonable system of road 
inspection and that the road was properly inspected and maintained. Whilst they 
acknowledged that there was some erosion of the carriageway surface, they 
contended that it was not of sufficient severity to warrant repair in terms of their 
maintenance and repair policy. The defenders’ position was that the road was not 
dangerous to a motorcyclist, so long as he exercised reasonable care. 
 
The extent of the damage was the subject of disputed evidence at the proof. Two 
police officers who attended the scene of the accident gave evidence. One described 
the condition of the road surface as “horrendous.” He estimated the defective area to 
be 40mm to 50mm deep and in the line of a typical tyre track for a motorcycle 
negotiating the right-hand bend. The other indicated that the eroded area was 
between 25 and 50mm deep at different points. The pursuer also led expert 
evidence from a chartered civil engineer who said the defect was about 50mm deep 
and 12 to 17 metres in length. This presented a significant potential hazard to road 
users and the defenders should have identified and repaired it before the accident. 
The witness thought that the defenders’ inspector could be criticised for not noting it.  
 
The defenders led evidence from the collision investigator who considered the road 
surface to be not atypical of other sections of the A701 or similar roads. He 
described it as breaking up slightly on the left-hand side. Kenneth McCudden, the 
defenders’ roads inspector, also gave evidence. He explained the council’s system 
for inspecting, maintaining and repairing its roads. The council’s guidance prescribed 
reaction times for certain categories of road defects. Category 1a defects -those 
which presented an immediate and critical hazard to road users -required to be 
immediately made safe and repaired. Category 1b defects -those which presented 
an urgent or imminent hazard or risk of rapid deterioration- were to be made safe or 
repaired within 48 hours. This category included potholes exceeding 40mm in the 
wheel track. Category 1c defects -those which presented a moderate level of hazard 
or risk- were to be repaired within 7 days. This category included potholes exceeding 
40mm in depth in all other locations (i.e. other than in the wheel track). Category 2 
defects did not represent an immediate danger and were to be repaired within a 
planned programme of works. ‘A’ class roads were inspected on a monthly basis. Mr 
McCudden inspected the relevant section of road some 24 days before the accident. 
He then completed a safety inspection sheet which indicated that no action was 
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required. He described the damaged area as a slight unevenness at the road edge 
where he thought that 10 to 20mm of surface dressing had come off. He would not 
classify this as a Category 1 defect.   
 
Having heard the evidence, Lord Pentland concluded that the pursuer was not 
driving at excessive speed. He had not failed to exercise reasonable care. He could 
not be faulted for failing to notice the eroded road surface nor for the line he adopted 
in negotiating the bend. These findings were not sufficient however to allow the 
pursuer to establish liability. Rather, Lord Pentland directed himself in accordance 
with the approach set out by Lord Drummond Young in Macdonald.40  
 
The pursuer did not challenge the adequacy of the defenders’ system or method of 
inspection but perilled his case on the proposition that Mr McCudden’s inspection 
was negligent because he failed to identify the strip of eroded surface as a category 
1b or 1c defect. To establish his case on this “narrow basis” the pursuer required to 
prove that such a defect existed as at the date of inspection and that Mr McCudden 
was negligent in failing to identify it. In Lord Pentland’s opinion, the pursuer had 
proved neither of those points. Lord Pentland preferred Mr McCudden’s evidence to 
that of the two police constables. Mr McCudden was clear that there was no 
reportable category 1b or 1c defect at the time of his inspection and his evidence 
found support from other witnesses. Moreover, there was no evidence of previous 
accidents due to the allegedly defective condition of the road or that any other 
motorcyclists had experienced difficulties because of it. 
 
Those findings were sufficient to allow Lord Pentland to dispose of the action in the 
defenders’ favour. There was, in any event, no evidence which would have allowed 
him to hold that Mr McCudden’s inspection was negligently performed. No witness 
(other than Mr McCudden) had practical experience of carrying out road inspections. 
There was therefore no basis on which Lord Pentland could make a finding as to 
what exactly would have constituted a reasonable (i.e. a non-negligent) inspection in 
the circumstances. The pursuer’s action was accordingly dismissed.  
 
Conclusion 
Difficult questions can arise in relation to the private law liability of public authorities. 
Policy considerations play an important role and, in many instances, dictate a 
cautious approach to the duty of care enquiry. Mitchell v Glasgow City Council,41 and 
AJ Allan (Blairnyle) Ltd v Strathclyde Fire Board42, for example, demonstrate a 
restrictive approach to the private law liability of social landlords and the fire service 
respectively. No such restriction in liability has been applied to roads authorities 
however. A roads authority remains liable in respect of injuries caused by a “hazard” 
in circumstances where the authority is at fault in failing to deal with the hazard. The 
most thorough discussion of the issue in recent years is found in Macdonald. The 
long standing approach of the Scottish courts to the liability of roads authorities was 
affirmed and, indeed, robustly defended. Lord Drummond Young’s judgment clearly 
emphasises that economic arguments are relevant in this area and that regard must 
be had to the role of insurance to bear the risk of liability for accidents. In Lord 
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Drummond Young’s view, the Scottish approach not only operates rationally but is 
perhaps more fair and just than the English approach. Moreover, “[i]t may…be that a 
focused duty, to eliminate hazards, may encourage improvements in road safety 
more effectively than a general liability of the sort that appeared to be under 
consideration in the English cases.”43 
Lord Drummond Young’s judgment in Macdonald would prove to be the starting point 
for consideration of the issue of roads authority liability in both Bowes and Dewar. 
These two cases offer further guidance as to what is required for a successful action 
against a roads authority in Scotland. What practical advice can be proffered in view 
of the above case law?  
Bowes certainly sounds a cautionary note for any roads authority which might be 
tempted to disregard the safety advice of technical experts.  
As far as pursuers are concerned, two features stand out most prominently- first, the 
need for averments from which the existence of a hazard can be inferred and, 
second, the need for a secure foundation in the evidence to explain what a 
reasonable roads authority would have done in the same set of circumstances. The 
first of these requirements is clearly articulated by Lord Drummond Young in 
Macdonald. There, the pursuer’s pleadings did not address adequately the critical 
question of whether there was a true “hazard”. Critically, there were no averments of 
complaints or of any history of accidents at the locus.44 Furthermore, practitioners 
should remain mindful of Lord Pentland’s important caution in Dewar that evidence 
requires to be adduced as to what would have amounted to the exercise of an 
ordinary level of skill and care by the roads authority in the circumstances.   
While the common law duty which is imposed on roads authorities in Scotland 
continues to fulfil “a useful, if limited, function in the system of accident 
compensation”45 practitioners acting for pursuers should remain alert to the important 
cautionary notes sounded in the recent case law. 
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